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# π NoFuture-Memguard-PQ
**Ephemeral Post-Quantum Text Encryption Plugin for Mainstream Chats**
Version 0.5.0 | Built with love and defiance | Privacy is a human right, not a feature
## π― What is it?
NoFuture-Memguard-PQ is a **detached external encryption plugin** for any instant messaging platform. Use it in one browser tab while your mainstream chat (WhatsApp Web, Telegram, Signal, etc.) runs in another.
**Key features:**
- π‘οΈ **Memguard-protected memory** - Keys and plaintext secured against root access and memory dumps
- π **Detached architecture** - Completely isolated from mainstream chat platforms (no backdoors possible)
- π₯ **Ephemeral by design** - Total key destruction on session end (no future access)
- β‘ **Post-quantum ready** - Roadmap includes Kyber1024-90s and Dilithium5-AES
- π±οΈ **Anti-keylogger keyboard** - Virtual keyboard with randomized layout
## π Quick Start
```bash
# Install
git clone <repository-url>
cd nofuture-memguard-pq
go mod download
go build -o nofuture main.go
# Run
./nofuture
# Open http://localhost:8080
```
## π Documentation
For complete documentation, open `https://safecomms.virebent.art/README.html` in your browser.
## β οΈ Production Deployment
**NEVER expose the Go server directly to the internet without HTTPS.**
Use a reverse proxy (nginx, Caddy) with TLS certificates:
```nginx
server {
listen 443 ssl http2;
server_name safecomms.yourdomain.com;
ssl_certificate /path/to/cert.pem;
ssl_certificate_key /path/to/key.pem;
location / {
proxy_pass http://localhost:8080;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
}
}
```
## π Security Model
1. **Memguard** (PRIMARY) - Protects keys + plaintext in RAM against dumps, swap, debuggers
2. **Detached Architecture** - Mainstream platforms never see keys or plaintext
3. **AEAD Encryption** - XChaCha20-Poly1305 prevents tampering
4. **Total Destruction** - Keys irreversibly wiped on session end
## π What's Fixed in v0.5.0
β
Plaintext now protected by memguard (was vulnerable)
β
Real encryption (XChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD) instead of XOR
β
Real key exchange (NaCl box) instead of XOR
β
HTTPS enforcement (reverse proxy required)
β
CORS restrictions (no wildcard)
β
Rate limiting (60 req/min per IP)
β
Request size limits (1MB max)
β
Session timeouts (24h max)
β
Authenticated encryption (prevents bit-flipping)
β
Session isolation (no cross-contamination)
β
Secure cleanup on exit
## πΊοΈ Roadmap
- β
v0.5.0: Memguard + XChaCha20-Poly1305
- π v1.0.0: Kyber1024-90s + Dilithium5-AES (true post-quantum)
- π v1.1.0: Per-message ratcheting (forward secrecy)
- π v2.0.0: Browser extension
## π License
MIT License
## π¬ Support
Report security issues privately. For other questions, open an issue.
---
**One conversation. One key. One chance to read. No future access.**
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