| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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The old 10MB cap was checked against the wire body, but two base64 layers
sit between the raw file and that body: crypto.js base64-encodes the file
before AEAD encryption, then nym.Client.Send base64-encodes the ciphertext
again to embed it in the JSON sent to the local nym-client over its control
WebSocket. A file at exactly the old cap produced a wire body just over the
limit after the first layer, and would have blown nym-client's own hardcoded
16MB WebSocket message limit after the second, surfacing as an opaque 500.
Lower the wire-body cap to 11MB, which keeps the second base64 layer with
real margin under nym-client's 16MB ceiling. Effective safe raw file size
is now roughly 8MB, not 10MB.
Reported by Ch1ffr3punk on nym.forum, reproduced with an exact 10MB file.
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Self-contained hashcash-style PoW on /submit: client finds a nonce so
SHA-256("<unix-ts>:<nonce>") has enough leading zero bits, sent as an
X-Nymdrop-Pow header; server verifies and rejects expired or replayed
stamps, no challenge round-trip required. Difficulty tunable via
--pow-difficulty without a rebuild.
Also fixes a latent bug in the browser crypto: X25519 was being
requested as ECDH with namedCurve "X25519", which is not a valid
WebCrypto combination and always throws. Modern WebCrypto exposes
X25519 as its own algorithm identifier.
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End-to-end verified pipeline (browser -> HTTP relay -> Nym mixnet -> reader).
Client-side X25519+HKDF+AES-GCM-256, no-log blind relay, AGPL-3.0.
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